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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH, RICH COUNTY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

(
(

vs.

(

Case No. 970596-CA

LARRY H. BREITWEISER,

)
(
(

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

An officer approaches an accident to find a person pinned in a rolled-over
vehicle. The concerned officer calls for medical services for the injured person.
During the course of the accident investigation, the officer claims to detect the odor of
alcohol and arrests the injured driver for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
("DUI").
During the suppression hearing, die court suppresses evidence for lack of
probable cause, but determines the injured driver had voluntarily consented to the blood

draw for the officer's chemical test. Based thereupon, the blood test results were
admitted and the trial convicted the driver of DUI.
Further, during trial the jury convicted the driver on the premise that the
driver cannot operate a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 % or
greater. However, the law does not provide for a percentage determination rather the
law specifically provides that a person may not operate or be in actual physical control
of a vehicle if the person has a blood concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown in
a chemical test of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Based upon this plain error the
defense moved for a arrest of judgment, but the court denied said motion.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1997) (2)(3) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The Appellant appeals the final order
and judgment of the First Judicial District Court, in and for Rich County involving his
conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as amended).

2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1) Whether there was sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of
Mr. Breitweiser and the blood draw?
(2) Whether the consent to the blood draw was voluntary and without
duress or ?
(3) Whether the trial court properly denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to
Arrest Judgment?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1) - (2) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to
Suppress Evidence. The State failed to show reasonable attenuation between the illegal
arrest and the blood draw, and the blood draw by the EMT were privileged.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. "We
review the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
under a clearly erroneous standard/' State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996). We review the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of
those facts for correctness. See id.
State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997).
(3) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest
Judgment. The State failed to show reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent
circumstances in this case. The elements of the offense presented at trial are not
consistent with the law that reasonable minds could conclude that Mr. Breitweiser
3

should be found Guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Further, Utah Law
requires that all the elements of the crime to proven beyond reasonable doubt in order
to rebut the presumption of innocence.
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court may
arrest judgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense."
The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment is erroneous is
the same as that applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury
verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. Under that standard, a trial
court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an
element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt as to that element. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v.
McCardell 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State v. Romero. 554 P.2d 216, 219
(Utah 1976).
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14.
5th Amend., U.S. Const.

Utah Const, art., § 12.
4th Amend., U.S. Const.
14th Amend., U.S. Const.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953, as amended).
UtahR. ofEvid. 506.
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
4

This case arises from an appeal of the Final Judgment and Guilty Verdict

of Mr. Breitweiser for Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor. (R. at
107-08).

//.

Course of the Proceedings:
On October 25, 1996, an Information was filed and Mr. Breitweiser was

arraigned in open court wherein he pled Not Guilty. (R. at 7). On March 7, 1996, D.
Bruce Oliver entered his appearance and placed Mr. Breitweiser's jury demand. (R. at
20). On April 14, 1997, the court set trial to convene on Monday, July 7, 1997 at
10:00 a.m. (R. at 42). On June 30, 1997, the defense filed Mr. Breitweiser's Motion
to Suppress Evidence. (R. at 44-61). On July 7, 1997, the trial court held both the
suppression hearing, followed by the jury trial.
During the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the officer
lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Breitweiser. However, the trial court also
determined that Mr. Breitweiser consented to the blood draw.

///.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial court denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence and

then the jury convicted him of DUI. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied

5

Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Said motion was filed on the basis that
the Information filed and the instructions to the jury establishing the elements of the
crime were not consistent with one another. Moreover, the Information is not
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as amended). The court denied the
motion claiming Mr. Breitweiser was being very narrow in his focus and denied same
because there was a lot of evidence that was introduced. (R. at 133(329}).

IV.

Statement of Facts:
(A)

From the report:
This matter involves an accident and simply the odor of alcohol and

whether these facts constitute probable cause for an arrest. Deputy Dale Stacey's
report reads:
I came across the vehicle on regular patrol. It was off the road and appeared to
have been rolled. Mr. Breitweiser was trapped under the vehicle. I immediately
called for an ambulance and extrication equipment. We were able to get him
out. I could smell alcohol on him. I asked if he had been drinking. He stated
that he had a couple of beers. I placed him under arrest for DUI and requested a
blood test. He agreed to it and Kerry Stacey drew a sample of blood.
(R. at 8).
Subsequently, the report reads:
Mr. Breitweiser, do you understand that you're under arrest ? . . . for Driving
Under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.
(R. At 35). Additionally, the report states:
Facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of the motor vehicle are:
6

The vehicle was wrecked. He said he was the only person in the vehicle.
(R. at 35). Finally, on the last page, the report states that when asked if he had been
drinking, Mr. Breitweiser's response was:
Yes, I've had a couple of beers.
(R. at 35). [See Report, Addendum B].
(B) From testimony.1
Deputy Dale Stacey was proceeding west on State Road 39, and it runs
approximately 20-22 miles between Woodruff and Monte Cristo, when he happened up
to an accident. (R. at 108). Before arriving at the scene, the deputy passed three or
four other vehicles who were traveling eastbound while he was traveling westbound.
He concluded that the accident had just occurred as none of these other vehicles had
stopped to assist prior to his arrival. The location of the accident was approximately
six or seven miles from Woodruff. (R. at 109). The terrain for this area is mostly
fields and summer range grounds for livestock. Also, the road at the scene has a small
bend with a small incline then it straightens out. (R. at 109).
Mr. Breitweiser's vehicle was observed to be in the field to the south side
of the road right side up. The officer initially believed that a rancher must have driven
it to that position but then felt that it was too close to the fence so he stopped to

1

The record does not comport with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
as the trial transcript does not have a sequential number on each of the pages. Therefore
in this section, the appellant uses the original transcript page in referring to a cite to the
record.
7

investigate. (R. at 110, 130). As he approached the vehicle he noted some damage to
the vehicle,2 the vehicle was right side up, situated on its wheels. He also, observed
some stuff scattered along the shoulder off to the side of the roadway. Also, some skid
marks were noted on the road surface leading to the vehicle. (R. at 110). But the
officer could not see any apparent cause for the accident. (E.g., like a dead animal in
the roadway or on the shoulder. (R. at 117)).
The officer walked down the small embankment and climbed a fence
where the officer soon believed that the vehicle appeared to have gone through, because
it was on the other side of the fence. As he climbed the fence a dog approached him
and started growling, so the officer began talking to the dog, when he heard someone
faindy say, "Hello." The officer asked the voice where he was at, the voice
responded, "I don't know." The officer could not see the man, there was tall grass and
two ditches in the vicinity. He then started looking for the person while continuing to
talk with the man. The deputy finally located the man by crawling through the tall
grass. (R. At 111-12). The man, Mr. Breitweiser, was located pinned under the
vehicle, while the truck's front wheels were in the first ditch and the rear wheels were
in the second ditch. (R. at 112-13, 129). Mr. Breitweiser was also located in the
second ditch under the tire.

2

Admittedly though, the deputy could not tell whether the damage was fresh or old, only
extensive. (R. at 132). The officer didn't attempt to determine whether the damage was free. (R.
at 133).
8

When the officer located Mr. Breitweiser, only a limited conversation
ensued as he complained of some chest pains so the officer indicated that he was going
back to his squad car to call for an ambulance. While at his vehicle, he also requested
for extrication equipment. (R. at 113-14). The officer then returned to Mr.
Breitweiser's truck and asked him medical related questions (e.g, whether he was
hurling, had back pain, etc.). Mr. Breitweiser responded that he was pinned, he had
chest pains, and he couldn't move his arms. The one rear tire was slightly resting on
Mr. Breitweiser's forehead, but the front tire in the ditch kept the vehicle from rolling
back onto his head more. (R. at 115). Because, the deputy didn't know if he suffered
from a spinal injury that he wasn't going to move him until the ambulance, extrication
equipment, and back immobilization equipment arrived at the scene. (R. at 116).
Approximately 10-15 minutes later, Officer Jim Gregory, of fish and
game, arrived at the scene to assist, (r. at 117), and they walked around the scene. The
ambulance did not arrive for approximately 25 minutes after Deputy Stacey's arrival.
Mr. Breitweiser was removed from under the vehicle, by the men, EMT Kerry Stacey3
crawled underneath and steadied Mr. Breitweiser's head while the others pulled him
from underneath the truck onto a backboard. (R. at 119). Then they carried him to the
ambulance. During this time, Deputy Stacey smelled what he believed to be the odor
of alcohol. (R. at 120). While in the ambulance, he got closer to Mr. Breitweiser to

3

Deputy Stacey's brother.
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see if he could smell the odor again, and he did so he asked him if he had been
drinking. Mr. Breitweiser stated that he had a couple of beers. (R. at 120). Based
exclusively thereupon, the deputy placed Mr. Breitweiser under arrest and asked him if
he would submit to a chemical test. (R. at 120). Mr. Breitweiser responded in the
affirmative, stating, "Yes." The deputy was not the one who drew the blood, rather it
was his brother, Kerry Stacey who drew the blood. (R. at 121).
In trial, the deputy was asked what he thought had caused the accident and
the response was that it just appeared to the officer that Mr. Breitweiser had driven to
the left, over corrected and veered back to the right, (r. at 121), but he agreed that it
was possible that Mr. Breitweiser could have simply driven through the turn because he
was distracted, changing the radio station or getting a soda. (R. at 141). Deputy
Stacey also conceded that it could have been possible that an animal, such as a deer,
may have been in the road, (r. at 142-43), or even that Mr. Breitweiser could have
been dozing off. (R. at 156). Moreover, the deputy failed to check for mechanical
failure. (R. at 156). Meanwhile, while still pinned under the truck tire, Deputy Stacey
asked Mr. Breitweiser what had happened but he reported that he didn't know. (R. at
121).

10

The blood draw was taken approximately, 8:40 to 8:45 p.m.4 and just
after he had placed Mr. Breiweiser under arrest. (R. at 149). This was approximately
an hour after Deputy Stacey arrived at the scene.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Firsdy, Deputy Stacey could not arrest Mr. Breitweiser because the
accident and the coupled odor of alcohol fails to rise to the level of probable cause and
such "paucity of facts" available to him simply did not justify the arrest. The
articulable facts available severed the chain of rational inference from specific
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch/" 5 Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied
Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Secondly, the blood test in which Mr. Breitweiser submitted to was not
voluntary. Moreover, the state fails to overcome the argument of reasonable
attentuation after the unlawful arrest as well as it failed to overcome the presumption
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights by convincing evidence that such
rights were waived as required by State v. Harmon.6 Therefore, the trial court
4

Approximately 20 minutes after arriving at the scene. (R. at 124).

* State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003
(Colo. 1983).
« State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1993).
ii

erroneously denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Finally, the State failed to present evidence establishing all the elements
of the offense charged. The State's case consisted of evidence that Mr. Breitweiser was
guilty of having a blood-alcohol consentration of .08% or greater. However, the
statute specifically prohibits an accused from having a blood-alcohol consentration of
.08 grams or greater of alcohol per 100 mililiters of blood. Therefore, the trial court
erroneously denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest Judgment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEPUTY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST MR. BREITWEISER.
A.

Introduction.
Article I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
(emphasis added)
Utah Const, art. I § 14.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is identical on
content.

B. Preface.
As a result of a hearing on Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress

12

Evidence the trial court ruled that there was insufficient probable cause to believe that
he was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to arrest him for said
charge. (R. at 132{45}). To answer the question posed by Point I, we must analize this
point from two separate perspectives. The first aspect of analysis is: Was there
sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of the defendant and the blood draw?
The second aspect of analysis is: Was the blood draw and results privileged?

C.
Was there sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of the
defendant and the blood draw?
In determining whether or not there is sufficient attenuation between the
illegal conduct of the police and the subsequent conduct of the police there are a few
factors to be considered. The Utah Court of Appeals has reiterated the enumerated
factors in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996) wherein they stated:
The Utah Supreme Court has established several factors that the
reviewing court must examine in evaluating the attenuation issue:
temporal proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in
question, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the
purpose andflagrancyof the illegal misconduct. State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4; see also State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150
(Utah App. 1991), cert, dismissed, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994).
In Ham, the Court was dealing with consent obtained after a prior illegality by the
police. The issues for this case are the same.
The first issue addressed by the court is "temporal proximity of the initial
illegality and the consent in question." In this case, the temporal proximity is very
13

close, if not identical to the illegal conduct of the police. There is no substantial
change in the temporal proximity. The illegal arrest took place at the scene of the
accident and the subsequent blood draw as well took place at the scene of the accident.
(R. at 132(120}).
The second factor is "the presence of intervening circumstances." There
is no intervening circumstance which untaint the prior illegal conduct of the police.
The police arrested on the odor of alcohol, there was no additional evidence collected
which would enhance the situation or act as an intervening circumstance. Clearly the
immediate statement that he is under arrest followed by the request to draw blood leads
one to believe that he'd better go easy because he was already under arrest, no one in
Mr. Breitweiser's condition would want the officer to become physical. The arrest
statement is an attempt to demonstration police authority, and implicidy conveys a
threat.
The final enumerated factor is: "the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal
misconduct." The officer obtained the consent to draw the blood from Mr.
Breitweiser. The consent was obtained at a time when Mr. Breitweiser had been
seriously injured as a result of the automobile accident he had been in. He had been
trapped underneath his own vehicle for a substantial period of time with his truck tire
situated on his head, prior to the discovery of the accident by the police. Mr.
Breitweiser had to be extricated from underneath the vehicle and then they immediately

14

placed him in an ambulance on a backboard. The same person, Kerry Stacey,7 who
assisted in the extrication was the one who drew the blood for testing and who
administered an IV to provide Mr. Breitweiser with medical fluids.
Clearly, the arresting officer was on afishingexpedition. He did not
possess sufficient objective facts to support probable cause to legally effectuate an
arrest, and simply wanted to draw blood to enhance his case. The arresting officer
performed no field sobriety tests. The arresting officer did not even give the
admonition as required by the DUI Report Form filled in by the officer. (R. at 132{20,
35})(see Report attached, Addendum B). At no time was Mr. Breitweiser advised of
his Miranda Rights. The general conduct of the officer is clearly indicative on an
officer who was just on afishingtrip and had no real probable cause to arrest Mr.
Breitweiser or to draw his blood.
There was not sufficient attenuation between the officer's illegal conduct
and the blood draw as to remove the taint of the consent to the blood draw and allow
the results to be admitted at trial. The trial court's decision to admit into evidence the
blood draw results and not to suppress it was clearly erroneous. In State v. Lopez, 831
P.2d 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court granted the State an interlocutory appeal of
a traffic stop that did have sufficient attenuation. This is the case that resulted in the
Utah Supreme abandoning pretext doctrine. Upon certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court

7

The arresting officer's brother.
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in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) ruled that the pretext doctrine was not
needed and does not give additional Fourth Amendment protection because the conduct
of the officer must remain within the scope of the inception of the contact unless
supported by further probable cause to detain longer.
In this matter, the trial court allowed the blood test results to be admitted
based upon Utah Code Annotated Section 44-6-44.10. The trial court improperly relied
on this section in making its determination that the test results were admissible. This
provision of the law which is commonly refered to a implied consent law deals with the
authority of the Driver's License Division's ability to take enforcement action against
individuals who refuse to cooperate with the police in a DUI situation. This part of the
law is not intended to modify the Constitution of the United States or of the State of
Utah as the judge implied and ruled. (R. at 132(41-45}), Addendum C). In this
matter, the trial court should have suppressed the results. Nonetheless, the blood
drawn ws also protected under the Patient-Physician previlege.

D.

Was the blood draw and results privileged?
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 506 provides:

Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient.
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed
by a physician or mental health therapist.
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state.
16

(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician,
psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist,
advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental
health nurse specialist, or professional coimselor while that person is engaged in
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol
or drug addition.
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence
and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given,
by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by
examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a
physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health
therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are
present to further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health
therapist.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was
the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication
is presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the
privilege on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient
in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense,
or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon
the condition as an element of the claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant
to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if
the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization;
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the
course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party
or witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies
otherwise.
17

Id. The type of a relationship existing between Kerry Stacey and Mr. Breitweiser is
covered in Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 506. The information gleaned during the
treatment of Mr. Breitweiser by any treating medical personnel, including Kerry
Stacey, is privileged and as such should not be disclosed without Mr. Breitweiser's
expressed consent knowing that such statement woulkd constitute a waiver, which in
this case was not given freely, knowingly, and intelligendy. The blood draw in the
ambulance was consented to pursuant to threat, implied or expressed, as a result of the
immediately preceding arrest statement.
The Utah Court of Appeals, State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah
1993), addressed the issue of consent and articulated the test to use in determining:
Harmon also alleges the trial court incorrectly concluded that her consent
to search her home was voluntary because the consent was not freely
given but instead was a product of coercion and duress. Consent to search
is valid under the Fourth Amendment if (1) the consent was voluntarily
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the
prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993);
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 918. We apply a correction of error standard
when a defendant challenges the "legal content" of the trial court's
ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The trial court's factual findings will not be
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Id; Barnhart, 210 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 35.
Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is determined from the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, including the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah
App. 1990). In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be clear
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal, specific, and
freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent was
18

given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence
that such rights were waived. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App.
1990), aff d. 1993 WL 176211 (1993).
Id In the case at hand, the State cannot prove that the consent to the blood draw was
voluntarily given consistent with Harmon. Under the existing circumstances, the
consent surely was given under duress and unintelligently. The Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, (Utah 1980) provided the test to determine duress.
The Court stated:
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of
a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of
the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer.
Id.

It is clear to show on its face that the consent was under duress. The officer told

Mr. Breitweiser that he was under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and then
immediately asked him to submit to a chemical test. After just being pinned underneath
his truck by his head, it is equally clear that Mr. Breitweiser may not have been in the
frame of mind to reason the question and ponder his rights!
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the conviction, the
evidence of the blood consentration results should have been suppressed.
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POINT II.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
THE MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT.
After trial and before sentencing, Mr. Breitweiser moved to arrest
judgment. This Motion was made pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides as follows:
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or
jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew
or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the
circumstances.
Id

The question posed by this case is whether the State produced sufficient evidence

to show that a public offense had been committed. The jury had been instructed that
the elements of the offense for which a conviction could be determined would be the
.08 provision of the law. (R. at 76); (Addendum D).
At the time of trial herein both the evidence as well as the Information
charged Mr. Breitweiser of having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater. In
addition thereto the instructions to the jury required the finding of .08 grams Alcohol
Content or greater.
There was no evidence presented which would correlate % and or grams.
There was no evidence presented which would even suggest that there was a correlation
20

which could be made. It is contrary to Utah Law for an individual to have a blood
alcohol content measured in %. The law specifically requires that the blood-alcohol be
measured in grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. The Information filed by the
State and relied upon at the time of trial does not constitute a public offense. It is not
the duty of this Court or of the jury to fill in any blanks or holes in the prosecution's
case and especially an element of the offense.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-501 (1953, as amended) is directly at
issue.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. The State failed to prove all the elements of the crime at issue. An element of the
crime is the blood-alcohol concentration. By statute the prohibited conducted is grams
of alcohol per 100 mililiters of blood and not .08%. Therefore, the State failed to
prove a violation of law and the trial court cured its failure by denying the motion to
arrest judgment. This amounts to a violation of due process. The trial court
determined that Mr. Breitweiser was "too narrow" in his focus on an element of the
offense, (r. at 133(329}), and denied the same. The court should reverse this decision
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for the State has failed to prove the correct element of the offense as a matter of law.
In determining the correctness of this issue, State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d
994 (Utah App. 1989) added clarity. It been long standing and this court in Serpente
stated:
Because the facts of this case are undisputed, the sole issue on appeal is the
construction of § 76-9-702.5. Therefore, we apply a correction of error standard. See,
e.g., Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). Moreover,
'one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in light of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and
should be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give
the statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention
sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness.'
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Andrus v. Allred, 17
Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (1965)).
* * * *

As set forth earlier in our opinion, basic rules of statutory construction demand that
words be interpreted according to their plain meaning unless the context justifies a
different interpretation. InreM.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The
phrase "act of gross lewdness" is not subject to a plain meaning, but rather must derive
its definition from the context in which it appears. To this end, we resort to the
doctrine of ejusdem generis. This doctrine provides that "where general words follow
the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as
applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated." Black's Law
Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979). Accordingly, we find this case analogous to the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980), wherein the
defendant challenged his conviction of forcible sexual abuse. 4 The defendant claimed
the phrase "or otherwise takes indecent liberties" was unconstitutionally vague. The
Court rejected the challenge, and held that the phrase in question "refers to acts of
equal magnitude of gravity to those specifically set forth in the statute...." Id at 597.
See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 481 (Utah 1988); InreL.G.W., 641 P.2d
127, 129 (Utah 1982). "Viewing defendant's conduct in light of this construction, we
are unable to say that the language... [is unconstitutionally vague]." Kennedy, 616
P.2d at 597.
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This plain error has deprived Mr. Breitweiser due process of law.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Breitweiser respectfully requests this Honorable Court to vacate the
conviction as a matter of law. The trial court should have arrested the judgment and
further the evidence should have been suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of
May, 1998.

Ap.&^^Lt^
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 25th day of May, 1998,
I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: George W. Preston, Rich County
Attorney, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 84321.
Dated this 25th day of May, 1998.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Section
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
DC Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XDL Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule

Section 1. [Inherent a n d inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All political p o w e r inherent i n t h e people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896

Sec. 3 . [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land.
1896

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain anc establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or
hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
[Trial by jury.] [Proposed.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldic ? voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]

Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification
to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd as.)
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
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(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)

S e c . 13. [ P r o s e c u t i o n b y information o r i n d i c t m e n t —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless t h e examination be
waived by the accused with t h e consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without sue! 'examination and commitment. The formation of the grdnd jury and t h e powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

Sec. 9.

Sec. 14.

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
S e c . 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
[Trial b y jury.] [Proposed.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
n6* fewer t h a n eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish t h e number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons. In criminal
cases t h e verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
[1996]
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
1896
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause ofthe accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where t h e defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part a t any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or a t any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994

[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right ofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no w a r r a n t shall issue b u t upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing t h e place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain t h e freedom of
speech or ofthe press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to t h e jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury t h a t the m a t t e r charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
S e c . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for debt — E x c e p t i o n . ]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall a t any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, m a y vote a t their
post of duty, m or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18.

[Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post fac*p law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to t h e civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without t h e consent ofthe owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
1896

Art. IV, § 4
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AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT VIII

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infnnged.
AMENDMENT HI
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor*shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VH
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT K
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XH
[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bahot, the President. But in choosing the President,
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President,
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of VicePresident of the United States.
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AMENDMENT X m
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions

Amend. XVIII, § 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color
not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United Spates or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVTI
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors

of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT XVIII
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION 1 ]
Section
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Time limit for adoption.]
Section 1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
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(v) work accurately and reliably in an unsupervised environment;
(vi) resist tampering and give evidence if
tampering is attempted;
(vii) operate reliably over the range of motor vehicle environments; and
(viii) be manufactured by a party who will
provide liability insurance.
(c) The commissioner may adopt in whole or in
part, the guidelines, rules, studies, or independent laboratory tests relied upon in certification
of ignition interlock systems by other states.
(d) A list of certified systems shall be published
by the commissioner and the cost of certification
shall be borne by the manufacturers or dealers of
ignition interlock systems seeking to sell, offer for
sale, or lease the systems.
(e) In accordance with Section 63-38-3.2, the
commissioner may establish an annual dollar
assessment against the manufacturers of ignition
interlock systems distributed in the state for the
costs incurred in certifying. The assessment shall
be apportioned among the manufacturers on a
fair and reasonable basis.
(13) There shall be no liability on the part of, and
no cause of action of any nature shall arise against,
the state or its employees in connection with the
installation, use, operation, maintenance, or supervision of an interlock ignition system as required under
this section.
1994

41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may prosecute for certain DUI
offenses and driving while license is
suspended or revoked.
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by
prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to prosecute these alleged violations:
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of
Section 41-6-44; and
(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227,
which consist of the person operating a vehicle
while the person's driving privilege is suspended
or revoked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a
local ordinance which complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the
person was charged with violating as a result of a
plea bargain after having been originally charged
with violating one or more of those sections or
ordinances.
1996
41-6-44.10. Implied c o n s e n t to c h e m i c a l tests
for a l c o h o l or d r u g — N u m b e r of tests
— Refusal — Warning, report — Hearing, r e v o c a t i o n of l i c e n s e — Appeal —
P e r s o n i n c a p a b l e of refusal — R e s u l t s
of test available — Who m a y give test
— Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this
state is considered to have given his consent to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine
for the purpose of determining whether he was
operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited under Section 416-44 or 53-3-231, while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and
any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having
any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body
in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or
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tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe t h a t person to
have been operating or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, or while under the
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or
while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in
the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6.
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of
the tests are administered and how many of
them are administered.
(ii) If an officer requests more t h a n one
test, refusal by a person to take one or more
requested tests, even though he does submit
to any other requested test or tests, is a
refusal under this section.
(c) d) A person who has been requested under
this section to submit to a chemical test or
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not
select the test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test is
not a defense to taking a test requested by a
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to
the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest,
has then been requested by a peace officer to
submit to any one or more of the chemical tests
under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to
any chemical test requested, the person shall be
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or
tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests
can result in revocation of the person's license to
operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection
(a), if the person does not immediately request
t h a t the chemical test or tests as offered by a
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall
serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver
License Division, immediate notice of the Driver
License Division's intention to revoke the person's
privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle.
When the officer serves the immediate notice on
behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for
only 29 days; and
(hi) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License Division, basic
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if
approved as to form by the Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed
report, within five days after the date of the
arrest, that he had grounds to beheve the arrested person had been operating or was in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of
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41-6-44.20

Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had re(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person
fused to submit to a chemical test or tests under
obtains an unappealed court decision followSubsection (1).
ing a proceeding allowed under this subsec(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the
tion that the revocation was improper.
Driver License Division's intention to revoke
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been rehis license under this section is entitled to a
voked by the Driver License Division under
hearing.
this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudiin writing within ten days after the date of
cative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the
the arrest.
district court in the county in which the
person resides.
(iii) Upon written request, the division
shall grant to the person an opportunity to be
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest.
other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to
submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to
(iv) If the person does not make a timely
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subwritten request for a hearing before the divisection (1), and the test or tests may be administered
sion, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle
whether the person has been arrested or not.
in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th
day after the date of arrest for a period of:
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested,
the results of the test or tests shall be made available
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) apto him.
plies; or
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practi(B) 18 months if the person has had a
cal nurse, or person authorized under Section
previous license sanction after July 1,
26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer,
1993, under this section, Section 41-6may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or
44.6, 53-3-223, or 53-3-231 or a convicdrug content. This limitation does not apply to
tion after July 1, 1993, under Section
taking a urine or breath specimen.
41-6-44.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and
nurse, or person authorized under Section 26conducted by the Driver License Division, the
1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws
hearing shall be documented and shall cover the
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace
issues of:
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable
of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at
grounds to believe that a person was operatwhich the sample is drawn, is immune from any
ing a motor vehicle in violation of Section
civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the
41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and
sample, if the test is administered according to
(ii) whether the person refused to submit
standard medical practice.
to the test.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the diexpense, have a physician of his own choice advision or its authorized agent:
minister a chemical test in addition to the test or
(A) may administer oaths and may
tests administered at the direction of a peace
issue subpoenas for the attendance of
officer.
witnesses and the production of relevant
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the addibooks and papers; and
tional test does not affect admissibility of the
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the atresults of the test or tests taken at the direction of
tendance of necessary peace officers.
a peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and
tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer.
mileage from the Transportation Fund in
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to
accordance with the rates established in Secthe test or tests administered at the direction of a
tion 21-5-4.
peace officer.
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Divi(7) For the purpose of determining whether to
sion determines that the person was requested to
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be
submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to
tested does not have the right to consult an attorney
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to
or have an attorney, physician, or other person
appear before the Driver License Division as
present as a condition for the taking of any test.
required in the notice, the Driver License Divi(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a
sion shall revoke his license or permit to operate
chemical test or tests or any additional test under this
a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the date the
section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any
hearing is held for a period of:
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) apacts alleged to have been committed while the person
plies; or
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor
(B) 18 months if the person has had a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
previous license sanction after July 1,
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having
1993, under this section, Section 53-3any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of
223, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231 or a convica controlled substance in the person's body.
1997
tion after July 1, 1993, under Section
41-6-44.20. D r i n k i n g a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e a n d
41-6-44.
o p e n c o n t a i n e r s in m o t o r v e h i c l e pro(ii) The Driver License Division shall also
hibited — Definitions — E x c e p t i o n s .
assess against the person, in addition to any
( D A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a
while operating a motor vehicle or while a passenger
fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be
in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving,
paid before the person's driving privilege is
stopped, or parked on any highway.
reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
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Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) 'Tatient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist.
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state.
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family
therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered
psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor
while that person is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addition.
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained
by examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or
mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's
family who are present to further the interest of the patient because they are
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or
mental health therapist.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the
physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of
the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which
any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant
to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if
the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization;
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the
course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party
or witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise.
(Amended effective July 1, 1994.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 506 is
modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, and is intended to supersede Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-24-8(4) and 58-25a-8. There is
no corresponding federal rule. By virtue of
Rule 501, marriage and family therapists are
not covered by this Rule.
The differences between existing § 78-24-8
and Rule 506 are as follows:
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psychotherapists and licensed psychologists, it being
the opinion of the Committee that full disclo-

sure of information by a patient in those settings is as critical as and as much to be encouraged as in the physician" patient setting. The
Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506
further apply to licensed clinical social
workers. To meet this request, the Committee
included such individuals within the definition
of psychotherapists. Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social
work "means the application of an established
body of knowledge and professional skills in
the practice of psychotherapy...'." Section
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58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage
in the practice of clinical social work unless
that person: (1) is licensed under this chapter
as a certified social worker," has the requisite
experience, and has passed an examination.
Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certificates for "clinical social workerfs]." As a result
of including clinical social workers, Rule 506 is
intended to supplant Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-35-10 in total for all social workers.
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and criminal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies only to
civil cases. The Committee was of the opinion
that the considerations supporting the privilege apply in both.
(3) In the Committee's original recommendation to the Utah Supreme Court, the proposed Rule 506 granted protection only to confidential communications, but did not extend
the privilege to observations made, diagnosis
or treatment by the physician/psychotherapist,
The Committee was of the opinion that while
the traditional protection of the privilege
should extend to confidential communications,
as is the case in other traditional privileges,
the interests of society in discovering the truth
during the trial process outweigh any countervailing interests in extending the protection to
observations made, diagnosis or treatment.
However, the Supreme Court requested that
the scope of the privilege be broadened to inelude information obtained by the physician or
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or
treatment, whether obtained verbally from the
patient or through the physician's or psychotherapist's observation or examination of the
patient. The Court further requested that the
privilege extend to diagnosis, treatment, and
advice. To meet these requests, the Committee
relied in part on language from the California
evidentiary privileges involving physicians
and psychotherapists. See Cal. Evid. Code
§§ 992 and 1012. These features of the rule
appear in subparagraphs (a)(4) and (b). The
Committer also relied on language from Uniform Rule of Evidence 503.
Upon the death of the patient, the privilege
ceases to exist.
The privilege extends to communications to
the physician or psychotherapist from other
persons who are acting in the interest of the
patient, such as family members or others who
may be consulted for information needed to
help the patient.
The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under
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the direction of the physician or psychotherapist. For example, a certified social worker
practicing under the supervision of a clinical
social worker would be included. See Utah
Code Ann. § 58-35-6.
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to
disclose the confidential communication, but
also to prevent disclosure by the physician or
psychotherapist or others who were properly
involved or others who overheard, without the
knowledge of the patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with
by Rule 507.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated,
and further endorsed the concept that in the
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state
that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in terms of a *Svaiver" of the
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any
possible clashes with the common law concepts
of "waiver."
The Committee did not intend this rule to
limit or conflict with the health care data statutes listed in the Committee Note to Rule 501.
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child
abuse reporting requirements contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et seq.
The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was primarily in response to legislation enacted during the 1994 Legislative General Session that
changed the licensure requirements for certain
mental health professionals. The rule now
covers communications with additional licensed professionals who are engaged in treatment and diagnosis of mental or emotional conditions, specifically certified social workers,
marriage and family therapists, specially designated advanced practice registered nurses
and professional counselors,
Some mental health therapists use the term
"client" rather than "patient," but for simplicity this rule uses only "patient."
The committee also combined the definition
of confidential communication and the general
rule section, but no particular substantive
change was intended by the reorganization,
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment substituted "mental health therapist" for
"psychotherapist" throughout the rule; substituted "licensed" for "authorized" and "state"
for "state or nation" in Subdivision (a)(2); rewrote Subdivision (a)(3); deleted former Subdivision (a)(4), which defined "confidential communication"; rewrote Subdivision (b); and
made stylistic changes.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683.
A.L.R. — Physician-patient privilege as ex-

tending to patient's medical or hospital
records, 10 A.L.R.4th 552.

Rule 507. Miscellaneous matters.
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to
the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails

ADDENDUM B

CITATION NO.

D 220411
DUI REPORT FORM
CASE IDENTIFICATION:
.
„~_Date ff- 6 - 7 ^ Day -friJdu,
Accident U&
Case # ^ - ^ / ^ ^ T i m e Prepared
2f</3
Subject's Name U^n. N~fih>i4usk+r~
/
Address 4 4 2 CccJhy Cf«b, St*-*ibf»,y &,£
U(^L ^ c - - y
Place of Employment
Address ,
Home Telephone Number
Work Telephone Number
DOB " 7 - /o - Q J Driver License Number /4 / 9 £ 7 f 7 3
Time_ of Arrest
cfoyjT
Place of Arrest <>&'5)
ln«P 4/
Charges 0 ,„__.
„
Arresting Officer # ^
^ ^ 7
Arresting Agency PieL &~Jk. Shtiiff
\ off ^ ifAssisting Officers X U ^ &^u<A^t tkxrw ff*ya
,
II.

III.

VEHICLE
.
A j
Year
fflZ
Color
ftCQU/*s
Make /Zrf
Model ncfcrf
License # and State T o 9 ^ RL
Disposition J ^ j a x < W ^ /
Registered Owner
6 ^
/ £U,.~-e / J f . A / ^ r Address <J</7 < ^ ~ / ~ . CbbWITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically)
Name
Address

Y 77ft, <W/ )
5-h-sL^
tL.k

Telephone Number

Age/DOB

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
IV.

ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL:
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are:

H< *(&

ke JAXii Ike aJy

j*»/s«^ ^

V.

DRIVING PATTERN:
Subject's location when first observed
The facts observed regarding driving pattern:

VI.

PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT:

VII.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Odor of alcoholic beverage
I^U tfaffrCti,
Speech
Balance
Signs or complaints of injury or illness
fat
Other
nhvsical character
ictirc
Other physical
characteristics

h>2^

,
UPhicif

M A { i,<J*t

-tLe (,d><rfi>.

lAMiluiJ

,\v ^

*(£ S<j*d

w

-Wt^. I

I*JUWY$
J

FIELD SOBRIbTY TESTS: (Describe subjects actions)
1

Were tests demonstrated by officer?

Subject's ability to follow instructions

SEARCHES
A
Vehicle
.
Was subject's vehicle searched? w^>
idence
When? /4fW A » W J , W , V UU
Elide
Person who performed the search

Where?
-3

g^U,

"S[v*v f w u o / ^

(

.
HCOA^KA
S^-e^t
R~r
b,tfi^T

p^v-c Sk<x-e^

CHEMICAL TESTS:
Mr or Ms

ty>gt"w<tSi>&_ , do you understand that you are under arrest for

f

Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled
substance or metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 41-6-44 6 UCA)

•

An alcohol offense under 21 years of age in violation of 32A-12-209 UCA?

Response (if any)
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your
blood/breath I request that you take a
fc)(QgtA
test
breath- urine)
Q]

The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered

Test results indicating an unlawful amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or its metabolite in your
breath/blood/unne in violation of Utah Law, or the presence of alcohol and/or drugs sufficient to render you
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in denial, suspension, or disqualification of your driving
privilege or refusal to issue you a license
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response

Did subject submit tp a chemical test?
Test Administered by
Time
Results
Serial No of test instrument

Type of test
Where?
Was subject notified of results?

(if the subject refuses the test, read the following)
The following admonition was given by me to the subject
If you refuse the test or fail to follow my instructions, the test will not be given However, I must warn you
that your driving privilege may be revoked for one year for a first refusal or 18 months for a subsequent
refusal after July 1, 1993, with no provision for limited driving After you have taken the test, you will be
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, in addition to the
one I have requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests requested by me I will make the test
results available to you if you take the test
Unless you immediately request a test, the test cannot be given

Response, if any

(if the subject claims
D

right to remain silent or the right to cou

^1, read the following)

The following admonition was given by me to the subject:
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which is civil in
nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you the right to
refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you
submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if
you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited
license.

XI.

INTERVIEW
Was subject advised of the following
rights?
When?
_
By Whom
Where?
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before
any questioning, if you wish one.
4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering
questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning.
Were the following waiver questions asked?
1. Do you understand each of these right I have explained to you?
Response
2.

Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
Response

Were you operating vehicle?
Where were you going?
What street or highway were you on?
Direction of travel?
Where did you start from?
When?
What time is it now?
What is today's date?
(Actual time
Date
What city or county are you in now?
What were you doing during the last three hours?

_
Day of week?

Have you been drinking?
What?
How much?
Where?
When did you have your first drink?
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now?

Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind?
(What kind? Get sample)
When did you have the last dose?
Are you ill?
___
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:)
Were you involved in an accident today?
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident?
If so, what?
When?
How much?

Day of Week?

Last drink?

)
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ATTACHED DOCUMENTS:

I have attached the following documents to this report:
1. H

Copy of citation/temporary license

2. CS Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit

3. H^ Traffic accident report
4. j f t , Other documents (specify)

&

%

\

^

^

f

l

)

^

I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer. Special Function Officer, or Port-of-Entry Agent and
that the information contained above in this report form and attached documents is true and correct to my
knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties. It is my
belief the subject was in violation of Section 41-6-44. 41-6-44.4. 41-6-44.6. 32A-12-209, or 53-3-418 UCA
at the time, and place specified in this report.

Signature of Officer $/Agent

^

Agency: Kicl\ CrcZUi SkvfHQr

The original of this form and the Driver License copy of the Citation must be
sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to:

DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
PO BOX 30560
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84130-0560

*
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DAY

W
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PLACE WHEF<E
ACCIDENT OCCURRED: COUNTY

01..4.
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.EK

MILITARY
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16
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CITY O R T O W N .

17

2

1

Accident was outside city limits

*j

indicate distance Irom city limits or nearest town

ROAD ON WHICH
ACCIDENT OCCURRED:
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MILES

f

D

I

S

E

W

D

D X ) of

(AAJfu^

II18

CITY OR TOWN

T^TZ^Z
? c T ?

•

D L.D. U S E O N L Y

RAMP NO.

w

INTERSECTION
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FEETD

2. I F N O T A T I N T E R S E C T I O N .

^L

NORTH

D

TENTH Of A MILE

20

STATE/LOCAL

&Jp

S
D

E
a

W
D

A

of__

211

NEAREST INTERSECTION. STREET. HOUSE NO. LANDMARK
BE S U R E T O C O M P L E T E IF R O A D H A S M I L E P O S T

OFMILEPOSL.

K

221

1

VEHICLE YEAR

MAKE

BODY STYLE/TYPE CODE

MODEL

A

. / I (?X? I Grr!
LICENSE
PLATE
INFO

KXMC

U

FIRST

YEAR

INTERSTATE D

INTRASTATE D

NO OF AXLES

DIR OF TRAVEL

ft

NUMBER

3D?3 EL

/O

nsx:

PARTS DAMAGED

LAST

±rrt

COST OF REPAIR

PHONE( ^

STREET, CfTY. STATE, ZIP, PHONE NO.

7231

L5

CODE
STATE

MONTH

INITIAL

)^

L

24

2 5 |

OPERATOR
CARRIER

4ir<uo /
* *

Pafap

FIRST

V

I DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE (Reg 12.0001». w mo*)

(WaUOtNO A l l TPUtCRS)

lFTHPaSA50*Ao%7>7
OWNER

DESC. OF CARGO
CODE

'

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

US DOT

G.V.W.R.

VEHI£LE COLOR

INITIAL

j&&

HH& (lurtti*

ifjehev.
LAST

CJuh.

Skirt\}i*«u

STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP, PHONE NO.

fi^kj
PHONE(

tA.feSs
)

1\

DRIVER

1L
LoS\
Mil HftSfrys

STATE
DRIVERS
LICENSE

ORTVER-8
EDUCATION]

DUMBER

1. PUBLIC
2. C O M !

3. NONE
4.UNKN

YEARS
DRIVE EXP.

^

deal reiser
LICENSEECLASS
CLASS

V

DATE I MONTH
OF
BIRTH

ENDORSEMENT

EFFECTIVE DATE

INSURANCE COMPANY

DAY
DAY

YEA*|

I

T

I

07 /o iff
6 P9l*% c
EXPIRATION DATE

INJURY

w

|>4| g I
THROUGH WHAT
AREA EJECTED?

1m

y"
29

5

L{,M£/MXW
30

POLICY NUMBER

O 17 73SQ4*/
7

U

2_

1^
MAKE

VEHICLE

ADDRESS

AGENCY THAT SOLD POLICY

INSURANCE APPEARS VAUD

-Cos
IODEL

™ ^ / » ^ ^ ^ l

3,

^CtfOy
YSTYL^TYPECODE

VEHICLE COLOR

DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE

G.V.W.R.

DESC. OF CARGO

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE (R«g 12.000t» or mort)

CODE

INTERSTATE D

INTRASTATED

NO. OF AXLES

DIROFTRAVa

(MCLUDMQ A U I R A U f M )

CODE

321

33

P'AGRAM WHAT HAPPENED BELOW.

CAS^ NUMBER

Hea*on For No Diagram

VEHICLE N O . .

INDICATE ^...cCTION
OF NORTH

1 Officer not at scent

®

2 Vehicles moved
3 Oner

/.'/-

ESTIMATED TRAVEL SPEEO

I

.NO_

r^o

so
\*5
ADVISORY SPEED 55

ESTIMATED IMPACT SPEED

POSTED SPEED

:s7

•:UT3

I
I— :
INDICATE INTERSECTION TYPE

If Hazardous Materials were involved
list the placard number from off the
commercial vehicle:

DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
OTHER THAN VEHICLES.

R/jce
Name object and state nature and amount ol damage

ESTIMATE

owner of object struck
WITNESSES

Name

.Phone.
. Address.

Name

1

l¥lrVWTM-

FIRST Art) ADMINISTERED BY

I • Potceman
2'Fireman
3'Ambutace
4 • Paramedics
5*Doctor

isoo/q

6 • Private Individual
7-Hospital
0 • Helicopter Personnel
9 • None Administered
0-Unknown

. Phone.

INJURED TAKEN BY
1-Ambulance, Private
2- Ambulance, Fire
3- Paramedics
4* Private Vehicle
5- Helicopter
6-Other

m

|M| w *wr wo

TIME: Amb. Called:.

INJURED TAKEN TO

POUCE ACTIVITY

fify/auc*/

/ ^ W T U

Day
D i y Y e aYear
r

Q2Q5

Tune Notified ol Accident

Q3QS

Arrived st Scene

Driver No.
Other
Investigation ol accident
Completed al

. Charge:

Name

. Charge:

CVSA Inspection Y e a .

No.

Other action taken ,

X-

PHOTOfS) TAKEN
YESJ^r NOD

Officer at scene

Nam. <kmj H KcvfrvHiSer-

PRINT.

&crtsS&*s

9rmaUpt\
Source of Informatjpn
Montfi

MILITARY
TIME)

.Arrived:.

«?/-*-*</»

-D
O r ! ^

the same day
U*J*

Contacted station

•

7U/*«VC*

. day following

c f

VIDEO TAKEN
YESD NO)Q
FIELD DIAGRAM
Y E S f r NOD

& . L 4

If Yea. Report N u m b e r .

b/e s4ctc^f
OFFICER'S BANK A N D N A M E

)£2

I.O. NO.

Ktcln &> ±&
PATROL DIVISION

DEPARTMENT

2zJ£2k.
SUPERVISORS APPROVAL]

DATE OF REPORT

SUte U w requires that report be forwarded to Dept. of Public Safety within 10 days following completion of the Investigation. Mall ORIGINAL OF REPORT TO:

ADDENDUM C

1

breath.

2

THE JUDGE:

Mr. Oliver, I'm going

3

give you some grounds

for appeal

4

But I'm

5

in so doing

6

applies here.

7

grounds to believe that the defendant had

8

operating a motor vehicle while having

9

breath alcohol content

to

if you so desire.

going to deny your motion to suppress
I'll

and

rule that under 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 1 ( a ) ,

And I'll

rule that the officer

statutorily

had

been

the blood

And I, I accept your argument.

I accept

11

argument

cause to arrest

12

defendant at that point

13

think I'm

14

think that that prohibits the police officer

15

from inquiring,

16

that point

17

consent at that p o i n t .

18
19

in time.

in time.

the

I don't
from,

the tests at

I think you've got an

Now the defendant

implied

could have refused

and

if he had of refused then he had to be arrested

20 || (2) to apply.
21 || have probable
22 ||

for

Then that police officer has to
cause at that point

in time.

In other w o r d s , I don't think the

arrest

23 || under these circumstances made any

difference

24 || because of this 44 - 1 - 44 . 101 (a) .

And if

25 || incorrect

the

But I don't

going to separate those two.

from administering

or

prohibited.

10

there was not probable

it

in that

I guess
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1

II grounds for an appeal .

2 II

May I just point one thing

MR. OLIVER:

3 || out to the Court?
4

II

5

THE JUDGE:

You may.

MR. OLIVER:

This having grounds to

6

believe does not lessen--

7

apologize.

8

stand or sit and I don't know what the Court's--

9
10
11

And I don't know.

I

I don't know if the Court wants us to

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

Whatever you're most

comfortable at.
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.

I don't know.

I

12

don't believe that this provision of the statute is

13

intended to decrease the provisions of the

14

Constitution which require probable cause.

15
16
17

But aside from that and just moving on
down, reading from where it says:
"... officer having grounds to

18

believe that person to have been operating

19

or in actual physical control of a motor

20 II

vehicle . . . " .

21 ||

Now the next part becomes critical.

Not

22 || just the standard that the Court has looked at but
23 || we need to look at what standard we're trying to
24 || determine.
25 ||

"... while having a blood or breath
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER/TRANSCRIBER
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1

alcohol content

2

prohibited.".

3

statutorily

In other w o r d s , the officer has to have

4

made the determination.

This is not

an

5

investigatory

6

already made the determination that he isn't, that

7

he is driving or in actual physical control of a

8

motor vehicle with a blood or breath

9

content

tool but the officer has to have

statutorily,

alcohol

statutorily prohibited

under

10

statute 41-6-44 or 53-32-31 or while under

11

influence of alcohol, any drug or combination

12

alcohol and any drugs under Section 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 ,

13

while having any measurable

14

metabolite of a controlled

15

person's body in violation of 4 4 - 6 - 4 4 . 6 .

16

controlled
substance

the
of
or

substance

in the

Each one of these require the officer

make

17

the determination that there has been a v i o l a t i o n

18

of that particular

19

talk about having grounds

20

odor of alcohol and the accident.

21

statutory p r o v i s i o n .

So when we

it goes not just to the
But it goes to

II the fact that the officer must have grounds

22 || believe that there is a violation of one of
23 || specific

code provisions

24 ||

And so I think that, that puts

enumerated

to
those

therein.

25 || grounds on the level with the probable

PENNY C. A B B O T T ,

or
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cause
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1 II because he's got to believe that there's a
2 || violation of law.
3 || attempting

He's not just investigating

or

to make a determination as to whether

4 II not there's been a violation.

or

He has to already

5

believe that and then, and it has to be as to one

6

of these statutory p r o v i s i o n s , and then proceed.

7

That's what we're talking about because

8

where the implied consent

9

have been validly arrested

law comes in is after you
for violation,

10

where the implied consent comes in.

11

kick in before

12

that's

that's

It doesn't

then.

In other w o r d s , if I walk out of

this

13

courthouse and the officer says B r u c e , I want

14

to submit to a chemical test, and he's not

15

m e , he has no reason to believe that I'm under

16

influence of alcohol, does my implied consent

17

that I then at that point

18

the, to the blood or breath or urine test

19

their request?

20

arrested.

21 II that.

you

arrested
the
say

in time have to submit

N o , not until I've

upon

been

Not until there's probable

That's what that says.

cause

for

He has to have

22 || this grounds to believe there's been a violation
23 II the law on the specific

to

of

code p r o v i s i o n s .

24 || Otherwise, they could ask anybody and there's not a
25 || thing anybody could do about
PENNY C. A B B O T T ,
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1 II Mr. Preston or anybody else.
2 || the valid arrest
3 || implied consent

first.

You've got to have

That's what kicks

the

law and makes it, activates

it and

4 II puts it into effect.
5

THE JUDGE:

You make a strong
it.

The

argument,

6

Counsel but I, I won't accept

difference

7

is, is that it's a grounds to believe which I think

8

would rise to reasonable

9

probable cause and I'll

suspicion as opposed
so rule.

to

And I will rule,

10

however that I find that in this case it was not

11

probable cause to make the arrest.

12

reasonable

There's a

suspicion to believe or--

13

MR. OLIVER:

To investigate.

14

THE JUDGE:

-- grounds to believe that he

15

had consumed alcohol and was

16

under the

influence.

And I'll, and I'll make that ruling

17

that if you'd

like to take that up we'll have

18

appellate court decide whether

19

and your argument's

I'm

so
the

right or wrong

applicable.

20 II

MR. OLIVER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

21 ||

THE JUDGE:

Very w e l l .

Now with that I

22 || assume we're ready to proceed with the jury t r i a l .
23 ||

MR. OLIVER:

May we, may w e - -

I have,

24 || based upon the arguments that have been made

here

25 || today I've

that

previously

indicated

PENNY C. A B B O T T ,
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1 || I've

received the police reports and my

2 || is based upon the police reports.
3 || some additional

There's

been

information that's been brought

4 II this morning that I think is critical.
5

information

out

May we

approach the bench--

6

THE JUDGE:

You may.

Certainly.

7

MR. OLIVER:

-- just briefly.

I'd

like

8

it on the record but at the same time I, I would

9

like it as if the Exclusionary Rule were

10

effect.

I don't want to discuss

11

witnesses.

12

THE JUDGE:

13

Mr. Oliver.

14

microphone

15

chambers.

16

it in front of the

We can handle

in chambers and w e ' l l ,

MR, OLIVER:
witnesses

18

problem with that.

let's go in

Or if we could just have

clear the courtroom,

THE JUDGE:

Very w e l l .

are your witnesses that are present?

21

should reflect that all of the

22

witnesses have left the

23

Very w e l l .

24

MR. OLIVER:

the

I would have no

20

25

that,

What we'll do is we'll take a

17

19

in

Let's--

Who

Record

prospective

courtroom.

Go ahead, Mr. Oliver.
Your Honor, one of

the

things that came out in discussion this morning,
PENNY C. A B B O T T ,
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ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of driving and/or being in
actual physical control with a breath and/or blood alcohol content of
.08 grams or greater you must find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime, to wit:
1. That the defendant was operating and/or in actual physical
control of a vehicle at the time and place as alleged in the
Information.
2 . That while operating said vehicle or while being in actual
physical control of said vehicle, at the time and place
alleged, he had a .08 gram breath alcohol content or greater.
3. That the said place was in Rich County, State of Utah^
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is
your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements,
then you should find the defendant not guilty.

7G

George Preston
Rich County Attorney
Randolph, Utah 84064
IN THE RICH PRECINCT COURT OF RICH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

VS.
LARRY H. BREITWEISER
DOB 7/10/41
Defendant.
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the above-named
Defendant with the commission of the following offense(es):
COUNT I:
CRIME:

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION;
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

SECTION 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED
Class B Misdemeanor
Rich County State of Utah
SEPTEMBER 6, 1996

The acts of the defendant constituting the public offense were:
That the defendant, LARRY H. BREITWEISER, a person whose operated a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or the combined influence of alcohol
or drugs to a degree which rendered the person incapable of safely operating the
vehicle.
- AND/ORThat the Defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
within Rich County with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater.

This information is based on evidence from the following witness(es):
DALE STACEY, RICH COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF, KERRY STACEY AND JIM
GREGORY.
DATED:

OCTOBER

DATE FILED:

&£>

OCOTBER

. 1996.

